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Introduction  
 The “fundamental design” of the international commu-
nist movement and the goal of Soviet leaders, according to George 
Kennan in NSC-68, was “ to retain and solidify their absolute 
power” through “the dynamic extension of their authority” and 
“the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machin-
ery of government and structure of society in the countries of the 
non-Soviet world.”1 Such strategy threatened the power of the 
United States; consequently, Washington policy makers believed 
they had to exercise whatever extent of economic, political, or 
military influence necessary to counter the communist expansion 
inherently tied to the USSR. This belief lay at the core of the United 
States’ foreign policy for decades - from the execution of the Mar-
shall Plan to involvement in the Vietnam War, Washington bu-
reaucrats willingly intervened in the domestic affairs of other na-
tions in the name of halting the infectious spread of communism. 
 Mexico, notwithstanding the close bond it shared with 
the dominant anticommunist power, endorsed an outlook al-
most antithetical to that of the United States. During the Cold 
War, Mexico maintained its adherence to the Estrada Doctrine. 
First established by Foreign Minister Genaro Estrada in 1930, the 
doctrine advocated for each country’s right to self-determination 
and emphasized the importance of nonintervention. This doc-
trine, alongside a concern for its own independence, informed 
Mexico’s insistence on the inclusion of noninterventionist prin-
ciples in the Charter for the Organization of American States 
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(OAS) and its willingness to interact with communist countries.2
 The world views of the United States and Mexico col-
lided when Fidel Castro successfully led the Cuban Revolu-
tion of 1959 and established the first openly socialist state in 
Latin America. The United States, after identifying the com-
munist threat on its doorstep, responded swiftly and sought to 
lead the Western Hemisphere’s response, serving as an example 
for the other Latin American countries to follow. After impos-
ing its own sanctions on Cuba, American delegates to the OAS 
attempted to persuade Latin American member nations to act 
as anticommunist crusaders and chastise Cuba with harsh eco-
nomic and political retaliations. In their view, OAS members had 
to recognize the existing expansionist threat of communists and 
cease relations with Cuba to prevent its efforts to spark revo-
lutions in other countries. While the American delegates could 
not achieve their ultimate goal of having the OAS swiftly as-
sail Cuba, they succeeded in forcing them to impose sanctions 
against the island at the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Min-
isters of Foreign Affairs in 1964. The resolution of this meet-
ing concluded that Cuba had sponsored “terrorism, sabotage, 
assault, and guerilla warfare” in Venezuela.3 More importantly, 
it resolved that in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance “the governments of 
the American states [should] not maintain diplomatic or con-
sular relations with the Government of Cuba” and required that 
they suspend all their trade and sea transportation with Cuba. 4
 Mexico, defying the expectations of the Washington del-
egation, “steadfastly opposed any obligatory sanctions against 
Cuba” on behalf of the OAS even before the conference be-
gan.5 Even after Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay and Brazil (the last 
OAS members to hold out on severing relations with Cuba) 
adopted the resolution, Mexico still refused to follow suit. In-
stead, it chose to maintain economic and political interaction 
with the island.6 Because of this, Mexico transformed into a 
“window” from the mainland Americas into Cuba and served 
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as the only entry point into the island from the Western Hemi-
sphere.7 Mexico’s decision to retain its relationship with Cuba 
posed a threat to the anticommunist agenda of the United States 
on primarily two fronts: firstly, in Mexico’s domestic arena and 
secondly, in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba, through its consis-
tent contact with Mexico, could catalyze a communist uprising 
in the country, or use it as a base to export Cuban subversives 
to spark insurgencies in neighboring Latin American nations.
Considering the United States’ determination to suppress any 
communist entity, the significance of Cuba as the only social-
ist nation which penetrated the anticommunist sanctuary that 
the U.S. had sought to establish in the Western Hemisphere, 
and the geographical proximity of Mexico, the predictable 
course of action for the United States would have been to ex-
plosively retaliate against its neighbor. Despite all of this, the 
United States government did not punish Mexico in any way. 
The relationship between Mexico and the United States dur-
ing this time suffered no significant harm and continued cor-
dially.8 Why then, did the staunchest advocate of anti-com-
munism not excoriate its neighbor when it continued to 
interact with a communist country on both of their doorsteps?
 
Cold War Historiography: The United    
States, Mexico, and Holes in the Literature  
 For decades American scholars have studied the Cold 
War, and the already expansive literature continues to evolve. 
Historians have debated for decades on the origins of the Cold 
War, offering political, economic, and ideological reasonings for 
its inevitability. They have increasingly focused on the insepa-
rable nature of foreign and domestic policy, leading to the up-
surge in social history analyses that take the international context 
of the Cold War into account. This has produced studies that 
examine the effect that the war’s rhetoric had on the Civil Rights 
Movement, blue collar workers, women, and other societal 
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groups. As scholars explore the dynamics of social history and its 
international context in more depth, political history has largely 
taken a secondary role in historians’ studies of the Cold War.
 The attention of Mexican political historians, on the 
other hand, has only recently begun to transition from the revo-
lutionary era to the post-revolutionary period. Popular themes 
for analysis include the formation and limits of the modern 
Mexican state, the nature of political representation, the cre-
ation of political parties, the character of local and national 
elections, and the correlation between dissent and violence. 
In the context of the Cold War, the literature has centered on 
the presence of communists in Mexico, the nation’s relation-
ship with the Soviet Union, how the international context in-
fluenced domestic policies, and how the United States’ for-
eign policy objectives limited the Mexican presidents’ power.9
 Neither group of scholars, however, has extensively ex-
amined why Mexico’s unwillingness to match Washington’s anti-
communist fervor did not cause significant conflict between the 
two nations - especially given their geopolitical and economic 
proximity. In an effort to fill the aforementioned holes in the 
historiography, this paper utilizes a collection of declassified 
documents from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) along-
side archives from the State Department to investigate why the 
United States did not chastise Mexico for sustaining relations 
with Cuba after the OAS Resolution of 1964. More broadly, this 
paper seeks to shift scholars’ attention towards the relationship 
between the United States and Mexico, and how the Cold War 
impacted it. It first examines Mexico’s domestic front, analyzing 
how the factious nature of the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI) and the personal interest of individual politicians shaped 
Washington policy makers’ understanding of Mexico’s relation-
ship with Cuba. Afterwards, it evaluates the hemispheric impact 
of Mexico’s decision to maintain relations with Cuba, noting 
the United States’ concern with Cuba’s utilization of Mexico as 
a base to export subversives to the Latin American mainland. 
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Ultimately, I argue, the United States decided to not reprimand 
Mexico for its decision to retain economic and diplomatic re-
lations with Cuba because the bilateral relationship did not 
threaten to spread communism – not to Mexico or to other 
nations in Latin America. Washington bureaucrats recognized 
that Mexico’s opposition to the OAS resolution originated from 
considerations on party stability and prioritization of personal 
interests. They understood Mexico’s decision not as a direct af-
front to their ardent anticommunist agenda but as a continu-
ance of traditional political behaviors. In understanding Mexico’s 
characteristic political behaviors and respecting their deviation 
from the hemispheric foreign policy, the United States was able 
to strengthen the country’s ability to combat communism with-
in its borders. Mexico’s relationship with Cuba not only posed 
a minimal threat of spreading communism, but it could actu-
ally have the power to prevent its dissemination. The United 
States, therefore, had minimal reason to chastise its neighbor, 
and rather had every reason to quietly support its decision.
Mexico’s Domestic Front: The Protection of the PRI 
 Paradoxically, in allowing Mexico to retain its relation-
ship with Cuba the United States strengthened Mexico’s primary 
political party and its ability to resist communism. By 1964, the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had monopolized the 
political system of Mexico for nearly four decades. The CIA rec-
ognized that the party’s subsumption of “groups ranging from the 
far left to the extreme right”  allowed it to control “almost all ele-
ments of Mexican society” and break “the power of those it could 
not absorb.”10 They identified the PRI’s broad coalition build-
ing, in other words, as the key electoral mechanism that allowed 
the political party to preserve its monopolistic power. To build 
stability between the ranging sectors within the party system, 
the outgoing president always chose his heir to prevent internal 
fights over succession, thus maintaining the party unity neces-
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sary to emerge victorious at the polls. Additionally, the PRI did 
not tolerate any external challenge to its rule and quickly moved 
to suppress any opposition –from communists or otherwise. 11
 An overview of the PRI clearly indicates why a neigh-
bor with a stable one party dictatorship provided great conve-
nience for the United States. Not only did Washington not have 
to worry about an imminent communist threat on its border, 
but it also rested at ease knowing that one of the most influential 
countries in Latin America would not easily fall prey to com-
munism. Hence, so long as the PRI retained their monopolistic 
power, the United States could trust that Mexico’s foreign policy 
decisions would not result in an internal collapse to communism. 
When the end of his term approached in 1964, President Ad-
olfo Lopez Mateos had to reconcile conflicting factions when 
selecting his successor, like all previous PRI presidents had 
done. Unlike his predecessors, however, Lopez Mateos had to 
cater to an additional interest - the United States and the Lyn-
don B. Johnson administration. Earlier in the year, Johnson 
had pressured the outgoing president to align Mexico more 
closely with American foreign policy, creating tension between 
the two nations. In a conversation between the two presidents 
in February of 1964, Lopez Mateos admitted that “a number 
of recent events had led his country to adopt certain interna-
tional policies which had been interpreted by some people as 
anti-American.”12 Johnson, subtly pressuring Mexico into com-
pliance, responded that “he was sure that when the chips were 
down Mexico would be on the side of the United States.”13
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 The primary goal of United States foreign policy since 
the beginning of the Cold War lay in impeding the expansion 
of communism. In the Western Hemisphere, American bureau-
crats believed they would achieve this through the isolation 
of Cuba with OAS initiatives.14 Utilizing the OAS to advance 
their goals had dominated the United States’ hemispheric 
policy even before the Johnson Administration. Since 1960, 
before Castro had declared himself a communist, the State De-
partment actively sought to “impress upon Latin American the 
nature and seriousness of Communist penetration of Cuba.”15 
The United States repeatedly emphasized that the dangerous 
problem required preventative hemispheric action in the form 
of every member’s severance of relations with the island. 
 The United States first formally attempted to achieve 
this objective by expelling Cuba from the OAS. But key nations 
- such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico – opposed the measure. 
Consequently, the American delegation resorted to the bribing 
of right wing Central American dictators to secure the passage 
of the resolution. Washington officials, therefore, viewed the 
vote as an insincere and indifferent notion from Latin Ameri-
can countries to espouse its concerns with communism.16 
From left to right: Presidents Truman, Johnson and 
Lopez-Mateos in a meeting in 1959
Source: Wikimedia commons, National Park Service
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 To remedy this, Washington policy makers sought to 
use Venezuela’s condemnation of Cuba’s support for commu-
nist uprisings in its territory to emphasize the danger that Cu-
ba’s communist interventions posed. In doing so, they hoped 
to arouse the animosity needed to pass an OAS resolution that 
would force Latin American nations to suspend relations with 
Cuba. Shortly before Johnson’s meeting with Lopez Mateos, 
internal deliberations in the State Department between Assis-
tant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Mann, OAS 
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Special Coordinator for Cu-
ban Affairs John Crimmins, and others concluded that “while 
the Venezuelans should publicly lead the fight, we will have to 
give them plenty of support [through] an intensive selling job 
in Latin America.”17 Part of this “selling job,” would include 
“making noise” about Cuba’s intervention in Venezuela. But 
more importantly, the United States had to aid in the drafting 
of Venezuela’s resolution. This resolution would condemn Cu-
ba’s interventionism and recommend that OAS members sever 
relations with the nation. By taking such an intimate role in the 
process, the United States aimed to ensure that the vote on the 
OAS resolution would result in the accomplishment of its most 
pressing objective in the Western Hemisphere - containing the 
spread of communism.18 In light of these circumstances, John-
son - in his meeting with Lopez Mateos - alluded to the upcom-
ing OAS vote. He characterized it as a time when the meta-
phorical chips would be put down, and made it clear the United 
States expected Mexico’s loyal support in this critical time.
Mexico’s Domestic Front: Factionalism in the PRI
 As this unfolded on the international stage, Lopez Ma-
teos selected Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, his Minister of the Interior, 
as his successor. Described as “severe in dealing with com-
munist agitation during his tenure” by the Washington Daily 
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News, and as farther to the right than his predecessor by the 
CIA, the choice pleased the Johnson administration. Fulton 
Freeman, the American ambassador to Mexico, spoke ap-
provingly of the reports that Diaz Ordaz would win.19 When 
internal PRI opposition commented on this statement, upset 
at the prospect that the United States would aid their disfa-
vored candidate, neither Secretary Mann nor President John-
son chastised Freeman for supporting the wrong candidate 
but rather advised him on how to manage the backlash from 
Mexican press.20 The United States government, clearly ap-
proved of Lopez Mateos’ selection and viewed Diaz Ordaz 
as a candidate who would continue the PRI’s monopoly on 
Mexican politics. More importantly, Diaz Ordaz could poten-
tially act more decisively against communist groups than his 
predecessor because of his political standing, which further 
ruled out any significant communist challenge in Mexico. 21
 This choice, however, did not please all factions of 
the PRI – the left wing members of the party, led by former 
president Lazaro Cardenas, opposed the nomination of Diaz 
Ordaz. In addition to their disapproval of Diaz Ordaz’s stance 
on domestic policy issues, they also took issue with his en-
dorsement of the OAS resolution, as they assumed the in-
coming administration would follow its predecessor’s ex-
ample.22 Shortly before Mexico’s presidential elections and 
the vote on the OAS resolution, Secretary Mann described 
his trouble with securing Mexico’s vote in support for the 
resolution as stemming from this factious dispute. Mann in-
formed Johnson that while Mexico’s OAS ambassador Vi-
cente Sanchez Gavito stood on their side, he was working 
arduously to “trying to keep the party from splitting” over 
the language of the OAS resolution right before the election. 
 As Sanchez Gavito participated in deliberations where 
he fiddled “with words that everybody [could] live with,” 
members of the Johnson administration, including Assistant 
Penn History Review     90 
Mexico’s Cuban Connection
for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, acknowl-
edged that the factious bickering could prevent the US from 
securing Mexico’s vote.23 The Johnson administration, in 
short, understood how the PRI’s internal disputes affected 
Mexico’s foreign policy decisions in the OAS and decided 
to not force Mexico to vote in favor of the resolution. In do-
ing so, the Johnson administration chose to give Lopez Ma-
teos the room he needed to work on keeping his party united 
– a decision that in the long term would benefit the United 
States as it would allow the PRI to retain its dominance.
 The elections in Mexico resulted with Diaz Ordaz’s 
victory, but they did not end the factious tensions in the PRI. 
The newly elected president had to take care to appease the 
leftist faction in order to keep the party intact. The Diaz Or-
daz administration consequently chose to maintain Mexico’s 
disapproval of the OAS resolution, specifically voicing ob-
jection to the resolution’s “mandatory language” which obli-
gated member countries dissolve their relations with Cuba.24 
Therefore, when put into context, Mexico’s disapproval of the 
resolution indicates that one of the following two scenarios 
played out. Either inner party conflicts persisted in plaguing 
the PRI and Diaz Ordaz continued to negotiate with the left-
ist faction that initially opposed the resolution, or Diaz Or-
daz sacrificed his own position on the resolution and opposed 
it to appease the leftist faction and keep the party united.
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 In an attempt to secure Mexico’s vote and help the PRI 
leaders unite the party, the United States rewrote the language 
of the resolution on multiple occasions.25 But in the end, it did 
not come as a surprise to the American delegation when Mexi-
co voted against the resolution. As alluded to previously, Wash-
ington bureaucrats’ restraint in exercising retaliatory measures 
against Mexico for its vote against the OAS resolution reflect-
ed their understanding of the internal conflicts of the PRI as 
well as the United States’ own priorities in hemispheric policy. 
The Johnson administration primarily helped orchestrate the 
passage of the 1964 OAS resolution as a preventative measure 
to limit Cuba’s ability to catalyze communist revolutions in 
the mainland of Latin America. When it came to achieving 
this goal in Mexico, however, the nation’s affirmative vote on 
the resolution only supplied symbolic significance, whereas 
the continued control of the PRI provided practical protec-
tion. If Mexico’s opposition to the OAS resolution, thus, was 
the cost of precluding factious disputes in the PRI from split-
ting the party and ending its monopoly, the United States was 
Presidents Diaz-Ordaz and Johnson
Source: Yoichi Okamoto via Wikimedia Com-
mons
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willing to pay it in the name of the same goal that motivated 
it to support the OAS resolution in the first place: suppress-
ing all potential for communist expansion in Latin America
.
Mexico’s Domestic Front:     
Personal Interests as the Ulterior Motive  
 The trajectory of corruption in Mexican politics in the 
decades leading up to the OAS vote in 1964 demonstrated that 
in addition to factious disputes, personal agendas also sig-
nificantly shaped Mexico’s foreign policy decisions. Public 
statements made by Mexican politicians on the OAS resolu-
tion offer a glimpse into this pattern. For instance, Sanchez 
Gavito  reportedly “startled the New World diplomatic corps” 
at the OAS in arguing that “‘the Mexican government may 
fall’ if Mexico abandons its pro-Cuba policy.”26 Such an ex-
aggerated statement undoubtedly served as a rhetorical strat-
egy to justify Mexico’s position and possibly garner sympathy 
from the other OAS ambassadors, as the economic policies of 
Mexico at the time clearly disprove the veracity of the state-
ment. Mexico would significantly suffer from severing rela-
tions with Cuba if ending the relationship signified the loss 
of a significant source of critical imports or revenue from ex-
ports. Yet since the presidency of Manuel Avila Camacho in 
1940, Mexico had adhered to the Import Substitution Industri-
alization Model (ISI).  At the time of the presidency of Lopez 
Mateos, Mexico remained in the second phase of this plan; 
this second phase required the implementation of harsh tariffs 
to protect local industry from foreign competition and allowed 
domestic development to burgeon. Put simply, this meant that 
Mexico did not rely on Cuban imports.27 Cuba, similarly, did 
not serve as a primary destination for Mexico’s exports.28 
 Despite the lack of veracity of Sanchez Gavito’s 
claims, the official actions of the Mexican government sup-
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port the ambassador’s suggestion that the Mexican govern-
ment valued trade with the island. On two occasions, Mexico 
ignored the OAS’s sanctions on Cuba – it first rejected the 
OAS resolution of June 1964 cutting all economic ties with 
the island and afterwards, it refused to sign the OAS sanc-
tions adopted in July of 1964.29 Mexico’s reluctance to adopt 
the measures ratified by the OAS allowed the country, as a 
Mexican diplomat put it, to serve “as a window” to the state 
of Cuba.30 As more accurately articulated by the Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, Mexico served as a “gateway to Cuba –  the 
only entry point through which people and cargo [could] get 
into Cuba from the Western Hemisphere on a regular basis.”31 
Through this “gateway” role, Mexico facilitated the smug-
gling of contraband, serving as “a chief avenue through which 
machinery parts and other supplies desperately needed by 
Cuba” were smuggled from the United States. Mexico, more-
over, served as a passageway for Soviet aid to reach the island. 
A Mexican company, for instance, reportedly “sold to the So-
viet Union a million tons of sulphur which will be transferred 
to Cuba for use in that country’s sugar refining industry.”32
 When taken together, these factors - Mexico’s limited 
national economic exchanges with Cuba,  the high rhetorical 
value Mexican officials placed on maintaining this relation-
ship, the regular embezzlement of funds and the smuggling of 
goods to the island - suggest that PRI politicians potentially 
kept economic relations with Cuba to personally benefit from 
the profits generated by the illicit trade with the island. The 
high value Mexican politicians placed on trade with Cuba also 
insinuates that the commodities smuggled went beyond the 
machinery and sulphur mentioned by the newspaper articles. 
Smugglers likely transported other supplies critical to Cuba’s 
survival sourced from within Mexico, such as oil, given the 
lucrative profits available. These profits would have substan-
tially increased given that the OAS resolution hindered the is-
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land’s economic survival by demanding that the other members 
cut off economic ties with Cuba – the smugglers, therefore, 
would have held a near monopoly over trade with the island. 
 The relationship between PRI politicians of the late 
20th century and smugglers parallels the relationship shared 
by the modern PRI and drug cartels. In both eras, politicians 
demonstrated a willingness to create political conditions fa-
vorable to the smugglers’ transfers in return for a share of the 
profits. Greed and a desire for personal wealth, in other words, 
could have shaped Mexico’s foreign policy decisions in regard 
to Cuba. One could argue that the close relationship between 
the PRI and smugglers does not parallel, but rather served as a 
precedent for the modern dynamic between the PRI and drug 
cartels. In allowing contrabandists to move goods through 
Mexico while disregarding international agreements, the ad-
ministration of López Mateos paved the way for future PRI 
politicians and technocrats to accept agreements with drug 
cartels if it meant personal gain. The manipulation of the po-
litical context surrounding Cuba by PRI politicians adds yet 
another example of the enduring political party’s corruption. 
 Even if individual PRI politicians did not have direct 
contact with smugglers, politicians did not need intimate con-
nections to obtain profits from illicit commerce with Cuba. 
Corrupt PRI technocrats could have easily used their busi-
ness connections at the time to obtain a share of the revenue 
made by Mexican companies, such as the ones that illegally 
sold sulphur to the island.33 These new opportunities for rev-
enue that Mexican companies found through their country’s 
unique trading position with the island multiplied the oppor-
tunities for Mexican politicians to skim off the revenue that 
the government made from tariffs. PRI politicians, in short, 
had a vested personal interest in maintaining a source of rev-
enue which was uncontested by the rest of the hemisphere and 
did not hesitate to use their governmental power to protect it.
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 The United States government recognized the per-
sonalist motivations of Mexican politicians and accepted this 
corruption as a mechanism that helped maintain the PRI’s 
power.34 Though no State Department memorandum explic-
itly articulated it, the foreign policy team of President Johnson 
could have arrived at this same conclusion from their familiar-
ity with the inner workings of Mexican politics. Washington 
policy makers, in other words, inherently framed their reac-
tion to Mexico’s retainment of relations with Cuba with the 
knowledge of how personal interests influenced Mexican pol-
icy. In understanding this dynamic, Mexico’s refusal to accept 
the OAS resolution played out not as intransigence against 
the United States’ anticommunist agenda, but as a continua-
tion of long standing relationships between politicians, Mexi-
can companies, and smugglers. Therefore, the preservation 
of the bilateral relations between Mexico and Cuba presented 
no immediate affront to the United States’ objective of pre-
venting communist insurrections. Washington, consequently, 
had no pressing reason to reproach Mexico for its decision. 
Hemispheric Scale: Securing   
the Mainland through Preventative Measures 
 While the Johnson administration worried about Mex-
ico’s internal collapse to communism, it fretted more over Cu-
ba’s potential to utilize Mexico as a base to launch its efforts 
to support communist uprisings in Latin America. The regular 
efforts of Cuban diplomats in Mexico to stimulate revolution-
aries in Nicaragua in the years leading up to the Cuban Missile 
Crisis made this threat seem more imminent.35 Acknowledge-
ment of these activities affected the way in which members of 
the National Security Council participated in the drafting of 
Venezuela’s OAS resolution. They emphasized the importance 
of cutting transportation between Cuba and mainland Latin 
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America to prevent Cuba from further instigating revolution-
ary efforts in the continent. Special Assistant for National Se-
curity Affairs Gordon Chase, for instance, supported the OAS 
resolution calling “for the suspension of all air and sea commu-
nications between Cuba and OAS countries,” noting that such 
a measure would cut “the Cuba/Mexico airlink” and signifi-
cantly hinder Cuba’s ability to export subversives.36 Mexico, 
as mentioned, did not vote in favor of this resolution, nor did it 
cut its air link to Cuba, which meant it could still act as a launch 
pad for Cuban subversives into the mainland of Latin America. 
 Despite American politicians’ concern over Cuba’s po-
tential utilization of Mexico as a base to export communist 
guerillas, the political and diplomatic developments ensured 
that this threat was unlikely to materialize. Though Washing-
ton knew that the PRI would swiftly suppress any challenge to 
its rule, the more conservative character of the new Diaz Or-
daz administration added additional assurance that any com-
munist challenge would be quashed . William Raborn, Direc-
tor of the CIA, in a memorandum on the security conditions in 
Mexico described the political course of Diaz Ordaz as “to the 
right of his predecessor,” as he catered to the “moderate and 
conservative elements in the PRI [who] were exerting pressure 
to restrict the influence of Castroites, Communists, and other 
extremists.”37 Moreover, the same CIA memorandum on se-
curity conditions in Mexico noted that the administration had 
successfully “sharply limited pro-Castroite and other anti-US 
activities.”38 Mexico, in other words, would not serve as a fruit-
ful base for Fidel Castro’s efforts to export communist upris-
ings to the mainland of Latin America. The Diaz Ordaz admin-
istration – more than any of its predecessors – would subdue 
communist guerillas within Mexico’s borders before they had 
a chance to spread their influence elsewhere in the mainland.
 Aside from the heightened dedication of the Mexican 
government to crack down on any domestic or Cuban commu-
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nist activities in its territory, the United States ensured that no 
Cuban effort to export revolutionaries would succeed by rein-
forcing the defenses of the rest of the continent. Not only did the 
United States succeed in limiting the possibility of Castro send-
ing subversives to the mainland by orchestrating the ratifica-
tion of the OAS resolution - it went a step further by increasing 
military and economic aid to the countries most vulnerable to 
a communist attack. After the Johnson administration realized 
that Mexico would not suspend its relations with Cuba after 
the ratification of the resolution, it shifted its focus to protect-
ing the governments of Central America. While anticommu-
nist dictators and parties controlled the governments of El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua with aid from the 
United States, their rule was considerably less stable than that 
of the PRI’s.39 This fragility, alongside their geographical prox-
imity to Mexico, made these countries more vulnerable targets 
if a Cuban communist excursion established itself in Mexico. 
Accordingly, the Johnson administration increased both mili-
tary and economic aid to these countries to reinforce their ability 
to repress communist insurrections. From 1964 to 1965, indi-
vidual aid increased by $3,297,000 to El Salvador, $2,732,000 
to Guatemala, $3,742,000 to Honduras, and $17,982,000 to 
Nicaragua.40 Additionally, less than a year after the OAS voted 
on requiring member nations to cease relations with Cuba, the 
United States helped to establish the Central American Defense 
Council, otherwise known as CONDECA. A mutual defense al-
liance, CONDECA ensured countries would come to the aid of 
any member troubled by communist insurgencies in their terri-
tory. Washington officials also provided anti-guerilla training 
to the militaries of these Central American countries with the 
goal of better preparing them to suppress any communist upris-
ings – especially those which sprouted from Cuban support.41
 The United States, in other words, took preventa-
tive measures in Central America to minimize the influence 
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of Cuban communism through both stick and carrot mea-
sures. Increasing economic aid to these countries served as 
a carrot, allowing Washington to curb a rise in sympathy for 
communism among Central Americans by ameliorating the 
economic conditions of these countries. Fortifying the mili-
taries of Central America with a larger budget and improved 
military training against communist insurgencies served as 
a stick, ensuring that the extant governments stood a better 
chance of defeating Cuban sympathizing subversives if they 
attempted to foment an uprising. Should Cuban subversives 
even succeed in leaving Mexico, the geographic areas most 
likely to become targets of their operations now stood bet-
ter prepared to withstand their challenge. Because of the im-
plementation of these safeguards, the United States did not 
overly concern itself with the prospect of a communist revo-
lution carried out by Cuban subversives in Central America. 
Therefore, the Mexico-Cuba relationship posed a minimal 
threat of spreading communism to Latin America as a whole. 
Conclusion 
 The United States did not reprimand Mexico for re-
taining its relationship with Cuba because their connection, 
contrary to initial appearances, furthered the United States’ 
primary foreign policy goal: containing the spread of com-
munism. In fact, the Mexico-Cuba relationship reduced fac-
tionalist debates, ensured the continued dominance of the PRI, 
and reduced the possibility that Mexico would fall to commu-
nism. Moreover, Washington diplomats likely considered the 
influence of the personal interests of politicians as a source of 
Mexico’s foreign policy decisions. Mexico’s relationship with 
Cuba provided lucrative opportunities that gave technocrats an 
incentive to remain in power. Taking these factors into consid-
eration, the United States construed Mexico’s connection with 
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Cuba not as an affront to their ardent anticommunist agenda, but 
rather as an indicator of the continued influence of individual 
interests within the Mexican system. Both Mexican and Amer-
ican policy makers, moreover, swiftly moved to preclude com-
munist insurrections catalyzed by Cuban subversives – through 
harsher internal crack downs and the allocation of additional 
aid to Latin American countries with more vulnerable political 
systems, respectively. Any attempts from Cuba to utilize Mex-
ico as a base to export communist revolutions into mainland 
Latin America, consequently, stood little chance of success. 
An analysis between the relationship between Mexico and 
Cuba, in conclusion, reveals that this connection would not 
spread communism to Mexico or any country in the Latin 
American mainland. Instead, it strengthened Mexico’s ability 
to fight communism within its borders, which in turn prevent-
ed the spread of communism into the rest of Latin America. 
Requiring Mexico to abide by the OAS resolution would at 
best serve as a symbolic measure, and at worst, would damage 
Mexico’s ability to fight communism. Allowing for Mexico 
to carry out an independent foreign policy decision, on the 
other hand, served as a practical measure which achieved the 
primary objective of Washington’s foreign policy – prevent-
ing Cuba’s communist agenda from contaminating the rest of 
the hemisphere. For these reasons, the United States had no 
reason to retaliate against its neighbor for sustaining relations 
with Cuba; rather, it had every reason to support its decision.
 On its own, Mexico fulfilled the guarantees that the United 
States sought from every other OAS member through the 
ratification of Venezuela’s resolution. Through the steadfast 
domination of the PRI, Mexico proved to Washington that it 
would neither collapse to communism nor stimulate its surge 
in neighboring countries. In satisfying the principal goal of 
the United States – the suppression of all communist expan-
sion – prior to the resolution, Mexico did not have to abide by 
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the course of action that Washington diplomats dictated. This 
enabled Mexico to retain a higher level of autonomy over its 
foreign policy than the rest of the OAS member nations. In-
deed, as President Johnson expected, when all the chips were 
down Mexico was on the United States’ side - but this did not 
occur primarily from a premeditated choice. Ultimately, both 
Mexico’s trustworthiness and higher degree of international 
autonomy were unintended side effects of the one party dic-
tatorship built around the PRI’s greed and desire for power.
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